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Due Process and the Insanity Defense:
The Supreme Court's Retreat from
Winship and Mullaney
Indiana's state legislature recently shifted the burden of proof from the
prosecution to the defendant when an insanity defense is raised in a
criminal trial,' thereby allying itself with a minority of the jurisdictions.
Constitutional support for this measure is found in the 1977 case of Pat-
terson v. New York. 2 In Patterson, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of New York's second degree murder
statute3 which requires a defendant to prove he acted from extreme emo-
tional disturbance in order to reduce his crime to first degree
manslaughter. 4 The insanity defense was not at issue in Patterson;
however, the Patterson Court relied strongly on Leland v. Oregon' where
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of placing the burden of
proof of insanity upon the defendant.6 Thus, the Patterson decision
stands as a reaffirmation of Leland'
The Court's reliance on Leland, an insanity defense case, as support for
its decision in Patterson was logically correct. The extreme emotional
disturbance-insanity defense analogy is valid since both defenses negate
or mitigate criminal culpability and rest primarily upon subjective facts
focusing on the degree to which the defendant could control his conduct
'IND. CODE § 35-41-4-1 (Supp. 1978).
2432 U.S. 197 (1977).
3The relevant portions of New York's second degree murder statute (found in N.Y.
PENAL LAW §125.25 (McKinney 1975)) are as follows:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of
such person or of a third person; except that .... it is an affirmative defense
that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse .... to be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under
the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.
'Relevant portions of New York's first degree manslaughter statute (found in N.Y.
PENAL LAW §125.20 (McKinney 1975)) are as follows:
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of
such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute
murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance,
as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25 [see note 3
supra]. The fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing
murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any pro-
secution initiated under this subdivision ....
5343 U.S. 790 (1952).
6432 U.S. at 204-05.
UId at 206 "New York [in its second degree murder statute] did no more than Leland ...
permitted it to do without violating Due Process ......
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while committing the criminal act." The primary fault with the Patterson
and Leland decisions lies in their very foundation, i.e., it is constitutional-
ly permissible for the state to allocate the burden of proving criminal
defenses to the defendant where the defense reduces or negates culpabili-
ty and either mitigates or exculpates the defendant from criminal punish-
ment and social stigma. This note will examine the constitutional and
policy considerations underlying the Patterson decision as it applies to
the defense of insanity.
ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE
All jurisdictions in the United States excuse the accused from criminal
responsibility if legally insane at the time of the criminal offense.' The
courts employ a presumption of sanity in all criminal litigation,10
'A defendant's emotions have to be stirred by conduct which in his view is so outrageous
that he is provoked into reacting from extreme emotional disturbance, see note 40 infra,
and is therefore incapable of reacting rationally to the outrageous act. A legally insane per-
son does not have to be provoked by an external stimulus; he is unable to control his ac-
tions because of some internal defect in his reasoning process. See the various definitions
of insanity cited in note 9 infra.
'See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §16-8-105 (1973); IND. CODE §35-5-2-3 (Supp. 1978).
The traditional view of the insanity defense is that it tries to discriminate between those
cases where a punitive-correctional sentence is appropriate and those where a medical-
custodial sentence is a better course for the law to follow, see MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01,
Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Others have viewed the insanity defense as a device in
which those without mens rea can be singled out for commitment not as an alternative to
conviction and imprisonment but as an alternative to acquittal, see GOLDSTEIN AND KATZ,
Abolish the Insanity Defense-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853, 865 (1963).
The following are the better known definitions of insanity in the substantive criminal
law:
M'Naughten Rule orRight-Wrong Test (from M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722
(H.L. 1843)). The defendant cannot be criminally convicted if, at the time he committed
the criminal act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason from a disease of the mind of
sufficient magnitude as to not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he
did know the nature and quality of his criminal act, then he would be relieved of criminal
responsibility if he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. This test is followed in
over one half of the American jurisdictions, see W. LAFAVE & A. ScOr. JR.. HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW at §37 (1972) (hereinafter cited as LAFAVE & Sco7r').
Irresistible Impulse Test. The criminal defendant cannot be criminally convicted if it is
found that at the time he committed the criminal act he had a mental disease which kept
him from controlling his conduct even if at the time he committed the act he knew what he
was doing and that it was wrong. This test is often used to supplement the M'Naughten
Rule. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
Durham Rule or Product Test. The criminal defendant is not criminally responsible for
his criminal act if the act was the product of a mental disease or defect. See, Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875(D.C. Cir. 1954).
American Law Institute Test. A person is not responsible for his criminal acts if at the
time of the act, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to act in conformity to the re-
quirements of the law. See MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01(1), (Proposed Official Draft, 1961).
The insanity defense does not furnish a basis for extending leniency, it is a complete
defense, see e.g., People v. Cordova, 14 Cal.2d 308,311, 94 P.2d 40,42(1939): State v.
Hall,-Iowa-, 214 N.W.2d 205,207(1974).
I"M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843), "[Elvery man is to be presumed
to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, un-
til the contrary be proved to [the jury's] satisfaction .... Accord, Davis v. United States,
160 U.S. 469, 482, 486(1895)(presumption of law that all men are sane is justified by the
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establishing a prima facie case of sanity for the prosecution," requiring
the defendant to produce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption;' 2
once the presumption is rebutted, the defendant's sanity becomes an
issue to be decided by the fact finder. 13 The states' decisions split on
allocating the ultimate burden of persuasion on the sanity question. A
bare majority of twenty-seven jurisdictions treat sanity as an essential
element of the crime, requiring the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt.' 4 The other twenty-four jurisdictions treat the insanity
general experience of mankind and general considerations of public safety); Walters v.
State, 183 Ind. 178, 179, 108 N.E. 583, 584(1915)(every person is presumed to be sane). For
citations to the other United States jurisdictions that utilize the presumption of sanity in
criminal cases, see H. WIEHOFEN. MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 214 n.1
(1954)(hereinafter cited as WIEHOFEN).
By treating its citizens as responsible agents under the law, the state is able to obtain a
degree of socialization and respect for its laws while reflecting and encouraging the values
of human dignity and virtue, see GARDNER. Criminal Responsibility and Exculpation By
Medical Category-An Instance of Not Taking Hart to Hear 27 ALABAMA L. REV. 55,77
(1975).
The presumption of sanity saves time, money, prosecutorial resources and judicial
resources when sanity is not an issue in the case. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 160
U.S.469,485 (1895) (presumption of sanity prevents delay and embarrassment when sanity
not at issue); Young v. State, 258 Ind. 246,249, 280 N.E.2d 595, 597 (1972)(presumption of
sanity saves the state the trouble of proving sanity in the great number of cases where the
question will not be raised).
"See, e.g., Walters v. State, 183 Ind. 178, 179-80, 108 N.E. 583,584(1915).
'
2Traditionally, the burden of proof in criminal cases has two aspects. First, the burden
of production requires the prosecution to come forward with evidence that the crime was
committed and was committed by the defendant. Failure to bring forward this evidence
will result in a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. Secondly, the burden of persua-
sion, requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was com-
mitted by the defendant. LAFAVE & SCOTT. supra at note 9, at 44-45. It is uniformly held
that, as with most defenses, the defendant has the burden of coming forward with evidence
of his insanity in order to place his sanity in issue in a criminal case. Id.at 47. E.g., State v.
Allen, 27 Ariz. App.577, 581, 557 P.2d 176, 180 (1976); People v. Sutton, 43 Ill. App. 1008,
1012, 357 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 (1976); Rigglemann v. State, 33 Md. App. 344, 352, 364 A.2d
1159, 1164 (1976).
' 3 At bottom, the determination whether a man is or is not held responsible for
his conduct is not a medical but a legal, social or moral judgement....[Olnce
[evidence of the defendant's mental condition] is disclosed, it is society as a
whole, represented by judge or jury, which decides whether a man with the
characteristics described should or should not be held accountable for his
acts.
United States v. Freeman, 357 F. 2d 606, 619-20 (2d Cir. 1966). Accord, Gregg v. State,
-Ind.-, 356 N.E.2d 1384, 1386 (1977).
14E.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895); Dolchok v. State, 519 P.2d 457,
458 (Alaska 1974); State v. Cooper, 111 Ariz. 332, 334, 529 P.2d 231, 233 (1974); People v.
Johnson, 180 Colo. 177, 178, 503 P.2d 1019 (1972); State v. Davis, 158 Conn. 341, 355-356,
260 A.2d 587, 594-95 (1969), vacated in part 408 U.S. 935 (1972), vacated in part, 163 Conn.
642, 316 A.2d 512 (1972); Byrd v. State, 297 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1974); State v. Moeller, 50
Hawaii 110, 121, 433 P.2d 136, 143 (1967); State v. Myers, 94 Idaho 570, 573, 494 P.2d 574,
577 (1972); People v. Bassett, 56 Ill.2d 285, 296, 307 N.E.2d 359, 365 (1974); State v.
Thomas, Iowa. ,219 N.W.2d 3, 5 (1974); State v. Lamb, 209 Kan. 453, 473, 497 P.2d 275,
291 (1972); Robinson v. State, 249 Md. 200, 225-26, 238 A.2d 875, 889-90, cert. denied, 393
U.S. 928 (1968); Commonwealth v. Kostka,lMass.-, 350 N.E.2d 444, 451 (1976); People
v. Livingston, 57 Mich. App. 726, 732, 226 N.W.2d 704, 708 (1975); Warren v. State, 285
So.2d 756, 758 (Miss. 1973); State v. Jacobs, 190 Neb. 4, 6, 205 N.W.2d 662, 663 (1973) cert
denied, 414 U.S. 860 (1973); State v. Snow, 98 N.H. 1, 4, 93 A.2d 831, 833 (1953); State v.
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defense as a traditional affirmative defense and place the burden of prov-
ing legal insanity at the time of the criminal act on the defendant, usually
by a preponderance of the evidence.' 5
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
This jurisdictional split stems from the Supreme Court's surprising
failure to rule in Leland and Patterson that Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process requires the prosecution to bear the burden of proof on the in-
sanity issue, even though other precedent prior to the Patterson decision
demanded that the prosecution bear the burden of proof. Initially, in
Davis v. United States, 16 the Supreme Court recognized the interrelation-
ship between sanity and mens rea, concluding that the prosecution
should have the burden of proving sanity when an insanity defense is
raised. 8 Leland was an abrupt reversal of this position. 9 Later, in In re
Winship ° and Mullaney v. Wilbur,2' decided after Leland but prior to
Lujan, 87 N.M. 400, 403, 534 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1975); People v. Silver, 33 N.Y.2d 475, 479,
310 N.E.2d 520, 522, 354 N.Y.S.2d 915, 918-19 (1974); Wisenhunt v. State, 279 P2d 366,
371 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954); Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 456 Pa. 475, 482-83, 321 A.2d
627, 632 (1974); State v. Kindvall, 86 S.D.91, 95, 191 N.W.2d 289, 292 (1971); Collins v.
State, 506 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Holt, 22 Utah 2d 109, 111,
449 P.2d 119, 120 (1969); State v. Miner, 128 Vt. 55, 67, 258 A.2d 815, 822 (1969); Rice v.
State, 500 P.2d 675, 676 (Wyo. 1972); N.D. CENT CODE §12.1-01-03 (1975), §12.1-04-03
(Supp. 1977).
"E.g., United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 977 (1974); Griffin v. State, 284 Ala. 472, 475, 225 So.2d 875, 877 (1969); Stewart v.
State, 233 Ark. 458, 460-61, 345 S.W.2d 472, 474 (1961) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 935 (1961); In
re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 141, 496 P.2d 465, 474, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 562 (1972)(separate
trial on insanity); Ray v. State, -Del.-, 262 A.2d 643, 645-46 (1970); Riggins v. State, 226
Ga. 381, 382, 174 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1970); Henderson v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 454, 58
(Ky. 1974); State v. Marmillion, -La.-,339 So.2d 788, 796 (1976); State v. Collins, 297
A.2d 620, 637 (Me. 1972); State v. Hoskins, 292 Minn. 111, 133, 193 N.W.2d 802, 816-17
(1972); State v. King, 526 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Olson, 156 Mont. 339,
344, 480 P.2d 822, 824 (1971); Phillips v. State, 86 Nev. 720, 722, 475 P.2d 671, 672 (1970);
State v. DiPaglia, 64 N.J. 288, 293, 315 A.2d 385, 388 (1974); State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238,
249, 204 S.E.2d 649, 657 (1974); State v. Johnson, 31 Ohio St.2d 106, 117, 285 N.E.2d 751,
759 (1972); State v. Unsworth, 235 Or. 234, 237, 384 P.2d 207, 208 (1963); State v. Page,
104 R.I. 323, 330, 244 A.2d 258, 262 (1968); State v. Hinson, 253 S.C. 607, 620, 172 S.E. 2d
548, 554 (1970); Hogan v. State, 496 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), cert denied,
414 U.S. 862 (1973); Bloodgood v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 253, 254, 183 S.E.2d 737, 738
(1971); State v. Canaday, 79 Wash.2d 647, 677, 488 P.2d 1064,1082 (1971); State v. Pendry,
-W.Va.-,227 S.E.2d 210,220(1976); IND. CODE 35-41-4-1 (Supp. 1978).
One jurisdiction, Wisconsin, allocates the burden of proof according to which definition
of insanity the defendant elects to be tried under. See State ex rel. Schopf v. Schubert, 45
Wis. 2d 644, 648, 173 N.W.2d 673, 675 (1970)(State has the burden of proof under the
M'Naughten Rule and the defendant has the burden of proof under the ALI test).
16160 U.S. 469 (1895).
"'Mens rea is equivalent to the guilty state of mind required by statute. See generally
LAFAVE & Scorr. supra note 9, at § 27. Not all crimes require mens rea to find guilt. E.g.,
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)(president of corporation found guilty for
the mislabelling of drugs done without his knowledge); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S.
250(1922)(defendant guilty for selling drugs, not knowing their sale was illegal).
"For discussion of Davis, see notes 23-25 infra and accompanying text.
"9For discussion of Leland, see notes 26-30 infra and accompanying text.
20397 U.S. 358 (1970).
2'1421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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Patterson, the Supreme Court laid the constitutional groundwork for the
reversal of LelandL22 The ensuing discussion of Davis and Leland
documents the contradictory positions developed by the Supreme Court
prior to Patterson.
Davis established the rule for the federal courts that once the sanity
presumption is rebutted, the prosecution must prove the defendant's
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.23 Although the Court recognized the
relation of sanity to mens rea as an essential element of the crime, the
Court did not base its decision upon due process grounds. 4 Instead, the
Court's holding was prompted by a desire to adopt a federal rule consis-
tent with the majority of the more respected state courts.2 5
The holding in Leland made it clear that Davis was not a constitutional
due process case;26 the Supreme Court refused to apply the Davis rule to
the states. The Leland Court sustained the constitutionality of an Oregon
statute, which placed the burden of proving insanity on a defendant, in-
voking an insanity defense,27 against a Fourteenth Amendment Due Pro-
cess challenge. 28 The Court saw no inconsistency between the rule requir-
ing the defendant to prove his sanity and the rule requiring that the pro-
secution must prove every element of the crime appearing on the face of
the statute beyond a reasonable doubt. The seemingly conflicting prin-
ciples were deemed compatible because the insanity issue was not raised
until the conclusion of the prosecution's case-in-chief.L2 9 Thus, the Leland
Court abandoned the position taken in Davis that sanity and culpability
are interrelated for the position that the essential elements of the crime
listed in the statute are the sole indicia of culpability. 0
Subsequently, the Supreme Court deviated from its Leland holding in
Winship and Mullaney by demanding, as a requirement of Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process, that the prosecution prove any fact relating to
culpability, though the fact does not appear on the face of the statute.
Therefore, prior to Patterson, one could have concluded that the Supreme
Court would have required the state to prove sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt when an insanity defense was invoked.
2 For a discussion of Winship's and Mullaney's erosion of Leland, see notes 31-40 infra
and accompanying text.23160 U.S. at 486-87. See also Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 713 (1962).
21160 U.S. at 485-86.
2 
. at 488. The Supreme Court also believed that a desire for uniformity compelled this
result. See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 204 (1977)(Davis was not a constitu-
tional ruling); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790,797 (1952)(Davis did not set down a constitu-
tional standard).
2343 U.S. at 793.
2Id. at 792. Oregon still characterizes the insanity defense as an affirmative defense, OR.
REV. STAT. §161.305 (1975), placing the burden of proof on the defendant to prove his sani-
ty by a preponderance of the evidence, OR. REV. STAT. § 161.055 (1977).
2343 U.S. at 793.
29Id. at 795-96. In criminal trials, where an insanity defense is employed, the prosecution
must first, in his case-in-chief, attempt to prove every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. After the conclusion of the prosecution's case-in-chief, the defense
presents evidence of insanity. It is only after the defense rebuts the presumption of sanity
that the prosecution attempts to offer evidence in rebuttal that the defendant was sane
when he committed the criminal acts.
"°Justice Frankfurter dissented on this ground. Id. at 803-04.
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In Winship, the Supreme Court held as a general proposition that Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process mandates that the prosecution must
prove criminal guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The rationale for this
holding was a desire to afford the criminally accused a high degree of pro-
tection against erroneous conviction and to stimulate public confidence
in the criminal process by insuring the reliability of jury verdicts. 3 '
However, as Winship indicated, the Supreme Court had long assumed
"that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitu-
tionally required. 3 2 Therefore, Winship is important for its narrow
holding. Specifically, the Court held that the state must prove acts of
juvenile delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt when a finding of guilt
results in a loss of personal liberty and social stigma, even though
juvenile delinquency was not recognized by the state as a crime.3 3 Thus,
the Winship Court extended application of the reasonable doubt stan-
dard beyond the essential elements of a crime appearing on the face of a
criminal statute to include all facts relevant solely to punishment and
stigma. The logical application of Winship to Patterson would have
resulted in requiring the prosecution to prove the nonexistence of ex-
treme emotional disturbance, since the defense reduces second degree
murder to the lesser crime of first degree manslaughter. Winship
demands that the prosecution prove the nonexistence of criminal
defenses like the extreme emotional disturbance and insanity defenses
once sucessfully raised, if they result in an acquittal or in a mitigation of
criminal punishment and social stigma.3
4
31397 U.S. 358,361-64, the Winship Court's exact words are worth noting,
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in
our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal pro-
secution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the
possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the cer-
tainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction....
Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to com-
mand the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the
criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be
diluted by a standard that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned.
Id. at 363-64.32Id. at 362. In support of the proposition that the Supreme Court had always assumed
the constitutional basis of the reasonable doubt standard, the Winship Court cited the
following cases: Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Holland v. United States,
348 U.S. 121, 138 (1954); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949); Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1914); Holt
v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895);
Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881). Cf Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432
(1895).
3 Under the state law at issue in Winship juvenile delinquency was not a crime, but the
risks of punishment for juveniles and non-juveniles were identical. See 397 U.S. at 365-67.31The Winship court was ambiguous as to the status of the Leland decision since the
Court quoted approvingly from Frankfurter's dissent that "[i]t is the duty of the govern-
ment to establish ... guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This notion ... is a requirement and a
safeguard of due process of law .... 397 U.S. at 362 (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. at
802-03)(dissenting opinion). At the same time the Winship Court has cited the majority
opinion in Leland for the proposition that the Court always assumed that due process re-
quires the reasonable doubt standard which the state must meet in proving the essential
elements of the crime, 397 U.S. at 362 (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. at 795).
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In Mullaney, the Supreme Court applied the Winship holding to a
statute analogous to the one challenged in Patterson. Like the second
degree murder statute in Patterson, the Maine statute at issue in
Mullaney permitted the defendant to mitigate murder to manslaughter.35
The mitigating circumstance in the Maine statute was the heat of passion
on sudden provocation defense, the common law predecessor to the ex-
treme emotional disturbance defense.3 6 The statute permitted the fact
finder to infer malice aforethought, an essential element of the crime of
murder appearing on the face of the statute, absent proof that defendant
committed the homicide under heat of passion on sudden provocation.37
The Maine statute was declared unconstitutional; the Court expressly
acknowledged the mutual exclusivity of malice aforethought and heat of
passion on sudden provocation as concurrent states of mind, and
therefore, the requirement that the defendant prove heat of passion
necessarily meant he was negativing malice aforethought, an essential
element of the crime, in violation of his due process under Winship.3 8
Thus, Winship mandates that the prosecution should bear the burden
of proof both on the extreme emotional disturbance issue, Patterson not-
withstanding, since extreme emotional disturbance mitigates culpability,
lessening the punishment and stigma suffered upon conviction, and con-
committantly, the insanity defense which eliminates a finding of criminal
culpability precluding criminal punishment. The Mullaney Court not on-
ly supported Winship's rationale for the reasonable doubt standard, but
also extended Winship by announcing, first, that it would not permit a
state to avoid the Winship holding by drafting statutes that redefine
essential elements bearing on guilt into factors bearing on the severity of
punishment, permitting the state to shift the burden of proof to the
defendant without changing its substantive law, 39 and second, its intent
to scrutinize the operation and effect of statutes requiring the defendant
to disprove an essential element of the crime, looking to the interests of
both the state and the defendant in determining how the burden of proof
should be allocated. 40 The Patterson Court never reached this second
stage in the Mullaney analysis, since the extreme emotional disturbance
defense was not viewed as negating an essential element of New York's
"
5 The Maine murder statute at issue in the Mullaney case provided: "Whoever unlawful-
ly kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of
murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life." 421 U.S. at 686 n. 3.
The relevant parts of the Maine manslaughter statute provided: "Whoever unlawfully
kills a human being in the heat of passion on sudden provocation, without express or im-
plied malice aforethought ... shall be punished by a fine of not more that $1,000 or by im-
prisonment for not more than twenty years...." Id
16The Patterson Court admitted this fact. 432 U.S. at 206.
11 421 U.S. at 686-87.
I8  at 696-98. See also, LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 9, at §§67,75 (at common law, the
most important distinction between murder and manslaughter was malice aforethought,
which was the same as the lack of heat of passion).
11421 U.S. at 698.
-I at 699. See notes 50-62 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the possible
state interests justifying a shift of the burden of proving insanity to the defendant.
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second degree murder statute. Closer scrutiny shows that this defense
does negate an essential element of second degree murder in New York in
substance, if not in form.
FORM OVER SUBSTANCE: SUPREME COURT DISTINGUISHES
PATTERSON FROM MULLANEY
Departing from its previous course, the Supreme Court refused to ap-
ply Winship's reasonable doubt standard to Patterson, even though the
extreme emotional disturbance defense is the modern equivalent of the
heat of passion defense at issue in Mullaney. 4, Although a literal reading
of the. statutes at issue in Mullaney and Patterson show facial differences
permitting this inconsistent result, the logic of Winship rejects such a
superficial analysis. Deeper probing demonstrates the striking similarity
of the statutes: the New York statute, like the unconstitutional Maine
statute, required the defendant to disprove an essential element of the
crime.
New York's second degree murder statute differed from Maine's
murder statute primarily in one respect. In Maine, the drafters defined on
the face of the statute, the state of mind which exists absent proof that
the defendant killed with heat of passion on sudden provocation.
Therefore, Maine permitted the jury to infer malice aforethought when
the defendant failed to prove heat of passion on sudden provocation.
Unlike the Maine statute, the New York statute provided no basis for a
jury inference, since the New York drafters chose not to define in the
statute the state of mind which extreme emotional disturbance negates.
Nevertheless, the similar origins and functions of the extreme emo-
tional disturbance and heat of passion defenses lead to the conclusion
that the New York defense, like its common law predecessor, nullifies
malice aforethought by negating the state of mind common to all second
degree murderers but absent in first degree manslaughterers. 42 Also,
failure to prove extreme emotional disturbance mandates a finding of
malice aforethought under the New York statute, following the common
4432 U.S. at 206-07. New York's reformulation of the common law defense of heat of pas-
sion on sudden provocation into the statutory extreme emotional disturbance defense
came after the common law defense was criticized as being too limited since it took into ac-
count only direct provocation of the defendant by the victim himself. See LAFAVE & Sco'rr,
supra note 9, at § 76. The extreme emotional disturbance defense incorporates the idea
that where the defendant's emotions were stirred by other forms of outrageous conduct,
including conduct by some one other than the ultimate victim, the accused should be
punished for manslaughter rather than murder. In addition, the common law defense was
applied with strict objectivity where the defendant had to react as a reasonable man would
under the same circumstances. Under New York's extreme emotional disturbance defense,
the jury is to judge the reasonableness of the defendant's actions from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed
them to be.
42The extreme emotional disturbance defense does not negate the element of intent
because it is an essential element of manslaughter as well as second degree murder. See
notes 2 and 3 supra.
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law rule and Maine's statutory scheme at issue in Mullaney.41 In effect,
New York's second degree murder statute makes malice aforethought an
essential element of the crime by requiring the defendant to prove ex-
treme emotional disturbance to mitigate his crime. Therefore, New
York's statute is constitutional in form only; the state of mind that exists
without proof of extreme emotional disturbance does not appear on the
face of the statute, permitting no statutory basis for the jury inference.
By analogy to Patterson and Mullaney, where the mitigating criminal
defense negated an essential element of the crime, the insanity defense
can negate the mens rea element of a crime. Thus, if there can be no mens
rea without sanity, sanity should be an essential element of the crime to
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
SANITY AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME
Requiring a defendant to carry the burden in an insanity defense forces
him to nullify an essential element of the crime. 4 A comparison of the
mens rea element of murder with the definition of legal insanity in
California illustrates the negating power of the insanity defense. In
California the M'Naughton Rule is recognized; 45 a defendant is legally in-
sane and not criminally responsible if disease or defect of the mind so im-
paired his reason that he could not know the nature and quality of his act,
including its wrongful nature.46 Malice aforethought is a material element
of the crime of murder in California.4 7 If a person commits a criminal act
while unable to appreciate the nature or quality of his criminal act, under
California law he cannot be found to have acted with malice
aforethought;48 therefore, legal sanity is required before the requisite
mens rea for murder can be found.
A California murder defendant who raises an insanity defense must
prove his inability to have the requisite mens rea, and absent proof of in-
sanity, the court employs the sanity presumption allowing the jury to in-
fer the defendant's ability to have the requisite mens rea without requir-
ing the prosecution to present any evidence of sanity. This violates Four-
"For a discussion of how the existance of heat of passion on sudden provocation negated
a finding of malice aforethought in Mullaney, see notes 35-38 supra and accompany text.
"Justice Rehnquist in his concurring opinion in Mullaney took the view that the majori-
ty opinion in that case was not meant to have any effect on Leland v. Oregon. However, he
did concede that evidence relevant to insanity as defined by state law may be relevant to
whether the statutory mens rea was present, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 705 (Rehn-
quist concurring, an opinion in which Burger joined). Cf., Rivera v. Deleware, 429 U.S.
877,878 (1976)(Brennan dissenting) "[Tihe plea of insanity, whether or not the state
chooses to characterize it as an affirmative defense, relates to the accused's state of mind,
an essential element of the crime, and bears upon the appropriate form of punishment"
(italics added).
"See e.g., In re Ramon, 67 Cal. App.3d 787, 136 Cal. Rptr. 826,829 (1977).
41For further discussion of the McNaughton Rule, see note 9 siupra.
"CAL. PENAL. CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1977) "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."
"See People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.2d 795, 821-22, 394 P.2d 959, 975-76, 40 Cal. Rptr.
271,287-88(1964)(inability to appreciate quality of act, evidence of inability to have malice
aforethought).
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teenth Amendment Due Process because Mullaney forbids states' pro-
cedures requiring a defendant to prove his inability to have the requisite
mens rea for a crime, where that element can be inferred without proof by
the defendant to the contrary. No legitimate basis exists for
distinguishing the Mullaney holding from the California situation where
the insanity defense negates malice aforethought. Thus, in California, if a
defendant is prosecuted for murder and evidence of insanity is sufficient
to rebut the sanity presumption, then the prosecution should bear the
burden of proving sanity because evidence of insanity expressly negates
malice aforethought.
Moreover, even where sanity and mens rea are construed as separate
and independent elements, i.e., where insanity does not negate mens rea,
the prosecution should still prove sanity when an insanity defense is
properly raised. Winship and Mullaney require the prosecution to prove
every fact bearing on punishment, protecting the defendant against un-
just loss of liberty and social stigma.49 Since insanity is an exculpating
defense, the societal goals of Winship and Mullaney are best realized
when the prosecution is required to prove sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt when an insanity defense is invoked.
STATE INTERESTS AFFECTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Whether requiring the prosecution to prove sanity is justified on the
ground that the insanity defense negates mens rea or on the general
policy ensuring societal faith in reliable jury verdicts and protecting the
defendant against unjust punishment, Mullaney still permits the state to
allocate the burden of proof of a criminal defense upon the defendant, if
the state can show an interest of sufficient magnitude. 0 The Patterson
Court identified two state interests as partial justification for upholding
the New York statute.
First, the Patterson Court accepted the state's argument that it would
place a unique hardship on the prosecution to negate extreme emotional
disturbance when prosecuting a defendant for second degree murder. 1
By analogy, the Mullaney Court discarded this argument; the Court re-
jected the state's position that the prosecution was under an unique hard-
ship to negate heat of passion on sudden provocation under Maine's
murder statute, though the facts surrounding the defense were "peculiar-
ly within the knowledge of the defendant."52 Two possible explanations
exist for the Patterson Court's conclusion that the prosecution's burden
under the New York statute was significantly greater than the prosecu-
tion's burden under the Maine statute, neither of which are persuasive.
4 See notes 31-40 supra and accompanying text.
5 See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
"'432 U.S. at 207.
52421 U.S. at 702.
[Vol. 54:95
INSANITY DEFENSE
In Mullaney, the prosecution labored under no unique hardship
because the general trend in other states 'is to require the prosecution to
prove the absence of heat of passion.5 3 A similar trend requires the pro-
secution to bear the burden of proving sanity when an insanity defense is
raised." By contrast, the extreme emotional disturbance defense has not
been widely adopted, so current state practice provides little insight on
the hardship question. Significantly, the innovator of the defense, the
American Law Institute, recommended that the prosecution assume the
burden of negating the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.5 Although
drawing on the work of the American Law Institute, New York concluded
independently that the prosecution would be severely handicapped if the
reasonable doubt standard were applicable to the extreme emotional
disturbance defense.56 Alternatively, the Patterson Court's acceptance of
New York's hardship argument may stem from the fact that both the ex-
treme emotional disturbance defense and the insanity defense involve
proof of subjective facts peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge. In
contrast to Mullaney, Patterson may represent the Court's decision to
relieve the prosecution's difficult burden of proving subjective facts.5 7
This decision, however, ignores the principle that whenever the prosecu-
tion must prove the defendant's mental state as an essential element of
the crime, its proof necessarily involves subjective facts peculiarly within
the defendant's knowledge;58 thus no special hardship is imposed in the
extreme emotional disturbance and insanity context. By shifting the
burden of proving these defenses to the defendant the state simplifies the
prosecution's task in proving its case, but ignores the constitutional
justification for the reasonable doubt standard.
It is doubtful that the Constitution would permit a shift in the burden
of proof of an essential element of the crime simply because the prosecu-
tion has difficulty in meeting its burden of proof since the requirement
53421 U.S. at 696.
"More than half of the jurisdictions in the United States have departed from the com-
mon law rule requiring the defendant to prove his insanity when employing an insanity
defense in a criminal case. These jurisdictions have adopted a rule requiring the prosecu-
tion to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt when the defendant's sanity becomes an
issue in the case. For citation as to how each jurisdiction allocates the burden of proof
when an insanity defense is raised see notes 14 and 15 supra and accompanying text.
55432 U.S. at 220 (Powell dissenting)(citing MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.12, 210.3 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962); id& § 1.13, Comment at 108-18 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955)).56In adopting the extreme emotional disturbance defense in lieu of the heat of passion on
sudden provocation defense, New York relied on MODEL PENAL CODE §201.3, Comment at
46-48 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (see People v. Patterson 39 N.Y.2d 288, 300-01, 347 N.E.2d
898, 906, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 581 (1976)). For the text of the New York statutes allocating
the burden of proving the extreme emotional disturbance defense in New York see notes 3
and 4 supra.
"The Mullaney Court rejected the state's argument that requiring the prosecution to
negate the defense of heat of passion on sudden provocation placed too difficult a burden
on it. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
"See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943)(in all cases the defendant has greater
familarity with the facts of the crime, but this does not justify placing the burden of com-
ing forward with evidence upon the defendant).
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that the prosecution must prove every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt is based on the fundamental value determination that it
is far worse to convict an innocent man than let a guilty man go free. 9 In
Davis, Justice Harlan dispelled the state's argument that because the
prosecution would be unable to meet its difficult burden of proof, applica-
tion of the reasonable doubt standard to the insanity defense would in-
crease a guilty defendant's opportunity to feign insanity and gain an ac-
quittal. Recognizing the fear of depraved criminals going free, Harlan
stressed the fundamental principles of humanity and justice which
underlie the criminal law:
No man should be deprived of his life under the forms of the
law unless the jurors who try him are able, upon their con-
sciences, to say that the evidence before them.., is sufficient
to show beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime charged.
6 0
As Justice Harlan recognized, the interests of humanity and justice
which compel the due process requirement apply to the insanity defense,
despite the burden it imposes on the prosecution, because of the defend-
ant's interests against unjust loss of personal liberty and stigma which
inevitably follow conviction.
A second state interest identified in Patterson as a basis for state ob-
jection to judicial reallocation of the burden of proof of the insanity and
extreme emotional disturbance defenses is the state's sovereign right to
adopt and enforce laws regulating the substantive criminal law of the
state. The Patterson Court emphasized that the allocation of the burdens
of production and persuasion in state criminal statutes are part of the
overall administration of justice and regulation of criminal procedure,
legitimate state functions under our federal system of government.
61
Winship and Mullaney, however, do not infringe on substantive state
law, but rather they establish the procedural requirements for state com-
pliance with due process, assigning to the state the burden of proof of
every element of the crime and of every element relevant to punishment
and stigma.6 2
5 9See Buzynski v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6,9 (lst Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984 (1977).
6 Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1895).
Historically, the defense of insanity has been viewed with suspicion by the courts
because they felt that an accused criminal offender could feign insanity and escape punish-
ment for atrocious crimes. See Davis v. United States, 469 U.S. at 492-93; H. WIEHOFEN,
INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 155-56 (1933). Given the advancements of
modern psychiatry, the fear of the successful feigning of insanity is pro-
bably unfounded since a competent psychiatrist would be able to determine if the accused
is feigning insanity. See WIEHOFEN, supra note 10, at 45-49.
61432 U.S. at 201 (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 778 (1952))(Federal Constitution does
not prohibit requiring the defendant to prove his insanity when he employs an insanity
defense).
'
2Id. at 228 (Powell, J., dissenting). For example, a state does not have to choose malice
aforethought as the distinguishing factor between murder and manslaughter. It could pro-
perly decide to punish every person guilty of an unlawful homicide in a similar fashion,
without incorporating circumstances into its criminal code that bear on punishment.
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The Patterson Court read Winship and Mullaney narrowly, failing to
apply the reasonable doubt standard to the extreme emotional disturb-
ance and insanity defenses, by ignoring their inextricable relationship
with mens rea and by failing to properly consider societal and individual
interests against unreliable jury verdicts and unjust criminal punish-
ment protected by the reasonable doubt standard. The prosecution is
under no unique hardship to negate extreme emotional disturbance or to
prove sanity since they involve proof of facts which are no more subjec-
tive than mens rea; the Patterson Court misinterpreted Winship and
Mullaney's significance setting forth procedural requirements mandated
by due process that do not infringe on states' substantive law.
CONCLUSION
Abandoning the view set forth in Winship and Mullaney, the Supreme
Court in Patterson adopted the position that the prosecution must only
prove those facts bearing on the defendant's culpability that appear on
the face of the statute. Patterson will perpetuate the jurisdictional split
regarding the burden of proof in an insanity defense; states will continue
to be permitted to shift the burden of negating factors relating to
culpability which do not appear on the face of the statute but still bear on
punishment and stigma to the defendant.
Moreover, the Court's justification for upholding states' procedures re-
quiring the defendant to prove the defenses of either extreme emotional
disturbance or insanity is unfounded. First, the prosecution is under no
unique hardship to disprove these defenses because they involve proof of
facts no more subjective than are involved in proving mens rea in the
most routine criminal prosecutions. Second, judicial allocation of the
burden of proving sanity to the prosecution does not infringe on state
substantive law but incorporates the procedural requirements of due pro-
cess found in Winship and Mullaney. Thus, the reasonable doubt stan-
dard should be applied to the insanity defense due to the protection the
standard provides against unreliable jury verdicts and unjust criminal
convictions.
JEFFREY A. BURGER
However, if the state does decide to distinguish between defendants who commit unlawful
homicides, by incorporating facts like malice aforethought into its statutes, it must bear
the burden of proving those facts to convict.
Efforts to eliminate the insanity issue from criminal trials have been generally unsuc-
cessful. For example, California has adopted a bifurcated trial system where the issue of
the defendant's guilt is tried in the first trial and the issue of insanity is tried in a second
trial after the defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged in the first trial.
California has been unable to keep out evidence of insanity in the first guilt determining
trial since it has been held that evidence of mental disease or defect is admissible on the
issue of whether the defendant had the required mental state to be guilty of the crime
charged. See People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330, 343-58, 202 P.2d 53, 61-70 (1949). The few at-
tempts to eliminate the insanity defense have been held to violate due process. See Sinclair
v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 153, 132 So. 518, 522 (1931); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash.
106,116-24, 110 P. 1020,1022-25(1910).
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